Monday, July 11, 2011

Were Standard Operating Procedures Followed During Rockville Bomb Scare?


In the wake of the confusion following June 13 bomb scare on the Red Line, I wanted to know Metro's standard operating procedures (SOP) for such a scenario.

I asked Metro several times to provide them, but Metro ignored all requests, so I got them another way.

Below is the official SOP for a bomb scare. It's from the 2003 "Metrorail Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook." The 2003 version is the official version.

There is a 2010 version of the book that remains in a draft form. The procedures in it seem to place more responsibility on the Metro Transit Police, saying, for example, that the chief of the MTPD is the only one who can order the closure of a station. The "checklist" is also longer. You can read the entire 2010 draft bomb scare SOP here. (page 1, 2, 3)

I'd be curious to see what people think of either the 2003 or 2010 versions and if you think they were followed at Rockville.

While the 2010 book is in a draft form, Metro printed and distributed thousands. Your money at work.

The 2010 draft book is pictured above.
SOP #14 BOMB THREATS
14.1
14.2 14.3
14.4
Employees receiving a call with a bomb threat should attempt to obtain as much information as the caller will divulge, including the following:
a. location of the bomb b. scheduled time of detonation c. description of the bomb d. type of bomb
The Bomb Threat Call Checklist should be used, if available, to document the threat.
Employees shall immediately report any bomb threat call that they receive to the Transit Police through OCC or by telephone on 962-2121.
The Transit Police will be responsible for the overall coordination of bomb related incidents and establish liaison with the office of SAFE, local police, Fire Department and military personnel responding to the scene.
The Chief of the Transit Police or their designee is responsible for determining if facilities are to be evacuated.
KNOWN LOCATION OF THE BOMB
14.5 When the bomb is reported on an identified train, OCC will instruct the Train Operator to proceed to the nearest station, unload the train of passengers and secure it with the doors open for inspection by police, fire or other authorized personnel.
14.6 OCC will instruct Train Operators approaching the station on the adjacent track to stop outside the station and await further instructions.
14.7 When the bomb is reported in an identified station and directions are given from command personnel to evacuate, the Station Manager shall make prescribed public address announcements instructing passengers to leave the station.
14.8 Depending on the reported bomb location in the station, OCC may order Train Operators approaching the station to stop. Train Operators already in the station will be permitted to continue out of the station in normal service.
14.9 When the bomb is reported on the right-of-way, OCC will order Train Operators on both tracks approaching the reported bomb location to stop their trains prior to reaching the affected area and await further instructions.
14.10
14.11
Employees discovering suspicious objects or packages will not touch, move or otherwise disturb the items pending examination and clearance by appropriate police, fire or military personnel.
Train Operators within or approaching a reported bomb location, and employees equipped with portable radios that are in the vicinity of discovered suspicious packages/objects, will discontinue all radio transmissions. If it becomes necessary to transmit by portable radio, a minimum distance of 150 feet must be maintained between the suspicious item and the radio transmitter.
LOCATION OF THE BOMB UNKNOWN
14.12
When a bomb threat is received and the location and time are not given, OCC will issue the following instructions:
a. Station Managers shall inspect stations for any unattended objects or packages.
b. Designated employees shall inspect all train cars arriving at terminals for unattended objects or packages.
c. Train Operators shall observe the right-of-way for unusual objects or packages.
d. Employees discovering suspicious objects or packages shall secure the immediate area around the item and notify the Transit Police (related to section SOP 14.10).
INSPECTION
14.13 Third rail power may be removed to permit qualified persons to inspect a reported bomb location. OCC will ensure that all non-affected trains have departed the area before removing third rail power.
OCC ACTIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS
14.14 OCC will initiate operating procedures to ease train congestion by turning trains, initiating a single track operation or Metrobus shuttle service.
14.15 When a prolonged delay in service is anticipated, OCC may turn trains at both ends of the suspected area and initiate terminal adjustments to ease train congestion.
RESUMPTION OF NORMAL SERVICE
14.16
When the bomb is found or the threat is nullified by authorized personnel and it is determined that it is safe to operate, OCC will:
a. request a restoration of third rail power after all persons are in the clear and aware that power is to be restored.
b. restore normal train service and notify all concerned departments.
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Comments (23)

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So the SOP says go to the next station and evacuate the train, but this operator walked all the way back to see if there was a bomb?

FAIL!
Any procedures that involve people staying on a train with a potential bomb for over 45 minutes needs to be dramatically reevaluated.
Why doesn't the operator have more responsibility here? Doesn't make sense at all.
1 reply · active less than 1 minute ago
This operator broke the metro rule in speaking to the media on TV. That interview must have been organized.
2nd. She should have opened the doors immediatly and evacuated just like smoke or fire on a train.
3rd. She should be disciplined.
I understand why you would want this information, but as a security professional I see several problems with this post (1) you are relying on a document that is clearly marked "draft", with no information as to the subsequent revisions, and (2) no organization releases its procedures for how it responds to any sort of intrusion or attack for safety reasons. If the terrorists already know how your staff is going to respond, they will simply devise a way around your procedures. I really think this post should be redacted or deleted for the safety of the Metro employees who may be affected.
6 replies · active 715 weeks ago
You maybe a security expert, but you can't read. The sop posted is the oficial 2003 version.

And if you think this will be useful for some "terrorist" I feel sorry for you living your life in such fear.

Finally, Metro deosn't appear to have followed the sop, so the terrorists would win anyway:)
But there are links to the 2010 draft text. Please read the article before accusing others of not being able to read.
I would expect amendments through 2011 as well. SOPs are supposed to be living documents.
I would think anyone who wanted to commit such an act could probably figure out how the response would go. Sorry, but security plans are not exactly imaginative. Especially ones that rely on non-security people on the scene. The plans are even more obvious to a would-be assailant after observing the response to a suspicious package, which should be treated simmilarly to a suspected bomb.
Metro had many opportunities to try to make this case. They did not.
The MSRPH is available from multiple sources online, including WMATA itself: http://www.wmata.com/business/procurement_and_con...

There are no secrets here.
That was the 2010 draft SOP right? What does the 2003 official SOP say?
1 reply · active less than 1 minute ago
The 2010 draft SOP relevant text is accessible through the links. The 2003 SOP text is quoted in the main article.
These are incredibly cumbersome SOPs. When there's a bomb scare, the first priority should be to get the people off the train as soon as possible. Come back later and worry about wheither it was a bomb or not.
3 replies · active less than 1 minute ago
Read 14.5.3.1 of the draft text. Once WMATA knows which train has the scare, they notify the operator, and the operator gets the train to a station and unloads the train. Sounds like the first priority to me.
She could have opened the doors!
The draft was authored by a philosphy major. Ha!
To apply the SOP to the Rockville situation, think about what really happened. The first WMATA employee that learned of the threat most likely was the operator once that person heard from the passengers using the emergency intercom. So if you want to follow the SOP, the operator contacts ROCC, gets the order to get to a station, and takes the train to a station to unload.

But remember what really happened: the first sign of trouble for the operator was notification that someone had pulled an emergency/open-door handle (I mean the one located at the center of the car, not the handle of the door at the very end of the car). By the time the operator knew of the bomb threat, there already were people on the tracks, so moving the train most likely was infeasible since the response to people on the tracks is to cut off the third rail.

There were multiple situations happening at Rockville. Trying to apply just the bomb scare SOP is a bit difficult, especially since that SOP is written for all situations, ranging from a phoned-in threat to the entire WMATA system (buses, trains, bus stops, and stations) to a suspicious package being found on a specific vehicle.
On a similar note, we walked into Ballston Station on Saturday morning at about 11 am. There some police tape up in two places perpendicular to the building that houses the pastry shop (I guess that is the Hilton) and an Arlington Police truck nearby.

The odd thing is there was no police tape up between the truck and the building, so a guy was sitting on a bench in front of the building. We did not know what was up, until the Cop told the guy to move, then we noticed a backpack or something closer to the wall on the next bench in and that the truck was a bomb squad truck.

Given that the Arlington Police probably does consider it a threat since they sent over the bomb squad truck, it seemed lackadaisical that only a small area was cordoned off, and the area right in front of the potential bomb was not cordoned off.

That night we were at Kinkead's in DC for a three hour dinner and watched a unattended bag sit on a park beach for the entire time. I guess it’s only a risk if someone bothers to call it.
Unsuck,

Are you honestly expecting the readers of the site to actually sit and make sense of all that is contained in the SOPs?
Stick to the pretty pics of the operators texting, broken escalators, and the like.
The solutions to these problems are not as simple as advertised here, given the lack of expertise and how little people really know about such a complex system that is run by politicians, whose only goal is to make people happy, even when that is not in the best interest of the maintenance of the the system itself.
2 replies · active less than 1 minute ago
Insulting the riders and playing down any attempt to shed light on problems...

So, how long have you worked for Metro?
Guest again's avatar

Guest again · 715 weeks ago

The lack of responses for this posting, which requires one to actually use your head, is the clear evidence of the statement above.
I love this entry. Kudos for tracking down something (draft, dated) in the absence of a metro response. It's more than anyone else has done. I hope it stirs up more interest. Anyone against that? You like slavery/hate America/want the terrorists to win...
The real scare is that the guy who authored the "Draft" has never operated a train inhis life and is a philosophy major. But his daddy worked there so he got promoted afterwards.........

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